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lLIEGACCY 
There was only a jigsaw puzzle of dry 
ground; 
A shroud of unfinished power lines 
dangling in silence. 
Shadow cows wandered 
over broken fence pieces, 
prodding memories of grass. 
I asked a hungry man, 
Where is the beautiful land I came to see? 
This is her legacy, 
he told me sadly. 
The legend you seek is dead. 
She was once virgin bride to the world. 
Her dowry was a sea of zebra. 
Her wildebeest thundered 
like a summer storm. 
She was jungle, mountain, and river. 
Long ago her lxxly throbbed 
with blood and breath. 
She was warm and alive. 
We called her Africa. 
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Professor Weir contends that "the vegetarian 
argument from unnecessary pain fails" because: 
(1) "the Empirical Argument from Nutrition 
equivocat[es] regarding what is meant by 
'vegetarian,' 'adequate for human nutrition,' 
and 'unnecessary for nutrition,' " 
(2) "animals can be raised humanely and killed 
mercifully," and 
(3) "the primajacie obligation not to inflict pain 
is overridden by the nutritional risk of 
vegetarianism (especially veganism)." 
Weir fails to establish any of these points as compelling 
criticisms of a moral obligation to become vegetarians. 
We shall discuss each of his arguments in turn. 
The Empirical Argument from Nutrition 
Weir begins his attack on the proposition that "a 
vegetarian diet is adequate for human nutrition" by 
claiming that attempting to justify it by referring to "the 
large numbers ofvegetarians who are 'hale and thriving' " 
"obviously is an inductive hasty generalization, 
[because] the empirical fact that some vegetarians are 
healthy does not prove that all human!l-{)r even most 
humans-will be healthy on a vegetarian diet." 
However, far from being obvious, this charge of 
fallacious reasoning is false. 
DISCUSSION 
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An inductive generalization is hasty when the 
sample upon which the generalization is based is too 
small. Now, recent estimates place the number of 
vegetarians in the United States at around 10 million, 
with a similar number in the United Kingdom. There 
are many more millions of vegetarians around the 
world. This is not a small sample. Additionally, these 
millions of vegetarians come from both sexes, all 
stages of life, and a wide variety of ethnic, cultural, 
and sO'cio-economic backgrounds. They are a diverse 
as well as a large sample. 
But are these people healthy? Books advocating 
vegetarianism cite numerous, recent, scientific 
studies indicating they are. Common sensically, it is 
difficult to believe that tens of millions of people 
would voluntarily continue with a diet they found 
adversely affected their health. But that is what 
vegetarians who have the option of eating meat are 
doing and have been doing for many years, even 
generations. Indeed, my experience has been that the 
majority of American vegetarians are "health 
vegetarians" rather than "ethical vegetarians;" that is, 
most American vegetarians are vegetarians because 
they find that diet to be healthier for them. 
Consequently, although no inductive generalization 
could "prove," in some conclusive, deductive sense, 
that every person would find a vegetarian diet healthy, 
the generalization from the number of health 
vegetarians to the conclusion that "a vegetarian diet 
is adequate for human nutrition" is a reliable one. The 
considerable amount of empirical evidence for that 
generalization puts a considerable burden of proof on 
those, like Weir, who wish to deny the adequacy of a 
vegetarian diet. That burden is not met by his 
fallacious charge of fallacious reasoning. 
Weir's substantive effort to shoulder this burden is 
his contention that that proposition is ambiguous about 
what "vegetarian" covers and what "adequate" means. 
His concern with "vegetarian" is that this term is used 
to refer to both those who merely avoid eating meat 
and those who eat neither meat nor other animal 
products. The importance of this distinction for Weir 
lies in the possibility of obtaining nutrients necessary 
for human health from eggs and dairy products. So, 
the possible ambiguity of "vegetarianism" is really a 
secondary matter; it is basically the requirements of an 
"adequate" diet that concern him. 
Weir claims that "the vegetarian diet is so risky that 
no one should impose it on another person." The 
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vegetarian diet is risky, he argues, because of the 
following "facts:" 
"Vitamin B-12 is an essential nutrient and naturally 
occurs only in animals products," 
"only 5-10 percent of the iron in vegetables is 
absorbed during digestion," 
"infants and preschool children need animal 
protein," 
"vegan diets are also especially susceptible to 
deficiencies in calcium, riboflavin, Vitamin A, 
and Vitamin D," and 
different people and people at different periods of 
their lives have increased need of these 
nutrients. 
Incredibly, after presenting this litany ofdangers, Weir 
totally undermines his argument about the risks of 
vegetarianism by conceding that "supplements can 
make virtually any diet 'adequate.'.. So, all these 
fearsome "facts" about the risks of a vegetarian diet 
can be overcome by popping an occasional vitamin pilL 
Would that all the risks of life could be so easily 
conquered! 
Nonetheless, let us spend a moment on some of 
Weir's specific "facts." In the same paragraph where 
he says that Vitamin B-12 "naturally occurs only in 
animal products," Weir acknowledges that vegans, who 
eat no animal products, can get B-12 from "tempeh or 
miso (soy) fermented with the Klebsiella bacteria" or 
"yeast grown on media rich in B-12," as well as from 
vitamin pills and "fortified" foods. Since B-12 can be 
readily obtained in a variety of ways, even without 
supplements and even by vegans, how does our need 
for B-12 put vegetarians of either sort at risk? The 
reassuring truth of the matter is that we need only small 
quantities of this vitamin, that it can be obtained readily 
and inexpensively from plant sources, and that the surest 
and easiest way of doing this is via a so-called "dietary 
supplement." One such supplement, picked at random, 
contains 833% of the recommended daily allowance of 
B-12 in one little pill. So, one pill a week, and the 
"facts" about B-12 which frighten Weir are irrelevant 
As to the iron issue, the relevant fact is not what 
percentage of available iron is absorbed but whether 
the individual obtains the iron he needs. According to 
John Robbins, in Diet for a New America (Walpole, 
NH: Stillpoint Publishing, 1987), "long-term studies 
show no iron deficiencies arising from lacto-ovo or pure 
vegetarian diets" (p. 300). Apparently absorbing 5-10% 
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of the iron available in vegetables is all we need. So, ooce 
again, where's the risk from vegetManism of either sat? 
Again, Weir contends that "susceptible to osteo-
porosis, all vegan women must carefully monitor their 
calcium intake since they consume no dairy products." 
However, according to the August 1, 1986, issue of 
Science, there is a "large body of evidence indicating 
no relationship between calcium intake and bone 
density." Apparently, it is low levels of estrogen, not 
ofcalcium, that are the source of osteoporosis. Further-
more, according to Neal Barnard, M. D., "studies now 
show that high levels of protein-particularly animal 
protein-drain calcium from the body" (The Animals' 
Agenda, November, 1989, p. 7). He also notes that 
broccoli, kale, spinach, almonds, sunflower seeds, and 
other green vegetables and fruits are good sources of 
calcium, while "milk is probably the poorest choice for 
a calcium supplement." Thus, far from showing 
vegetarians, including vegans, at risk, the facts about 
osteoporosis indicate that it is meat-eaters who are most 
at risk to this disease. 
Weir does not elaborate on why "infants and 
preschool children need animal protein," and that 
statement looks more like a conclusion than a statement 
offact At the recent World Vegetarian Day celebration 
at Stanford University, Dr. Michael Klaper, a 
pediatrician and author ofPregnancy, Children and the 
Vegan Diet (Umatilla, FL: Gentle World, 1988), 
asserted that "there is nothing found exclusively in 
animal products that is essential for children's health 
and growth." Apparently, this practicing pediatrician 
has not encountered Weir's "facts." Also, Dr. Klaper's 
presentation suggested that vegan parents do not need 
to pay closer attention to their children's diets than do 
meat-eating parents to ensure that their children receive 
all needed nutrients. 
Weir asserts without citing studies that "vegan 
infants and children are usually malnourished, 
underweight, and neurologically underdeveloped." 
Might this be a hasty generalization? Even if 
statistically true, might there be socio-economic and 
educational reasons for this sad condition that have 
nothing to do with the adequacy of vegetable protein 
for children? For example, it's doubtless true that 
impoverished "infants and children are malnourished, 
underweight. and neurologically underdeveloped," and 
it may be that a considerable number of vegans in third 
world countries are impoverished. Once again, it is 
doubtful that Weir has facts here, and he fails to provide 
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an argument showing the relevance of whatever it is he 
does have to his claim that vegetarianism is risky. 
Thus, Weir's "facts" about nutrition are dubious and 
do not entail that a vegetarian diet ofeither sort is risky. 
Nor does his analysis entail whatWeir ought (logically) 
to be trying to prove but never mentions: that a 
vegetarian diet is more risky than a meat-eating diet. 
After all, if a meat-eating diet is more risky than a 
vegetarian diet, then Weir's argument based on the risks 
of vegetarianism is irrelevant in yet another way. 
Perhaps Weir does not undertake this comparative 
analysis because he afraid of what it would show. 
Judging from the massive size of the vitamin industry 
and its advertisements, which do not even suggest that 
it is only or primarily vegetarians who should be 
buying these products, meat-eaters must feel a great 
need to supplement their diets. Also, vegetarian diets 
reduce many kinds of health risk, such as trichinosis, 
salmonella, and mercury poisoning, various kinds of 
cancer, osteoporosis, arteriosclerosis, and other 
conditions associated with saturated fats and 
cholesterol, which are more prevalent in meat than 
vegetables. The United States Department of 
Agriculture spends a lot of money on inspecting meat 
for health hazards, and a lot of questions have recently 
been raised about the adequacy of those inspections. 
Vegetarians do not have to fear all those hazards meat 
inspectors are supposed to be guarding against, nor 
do they have to fear that these inspectors are not doing 
their job. Thus, an unbiased review of the risks 
actually run by vegetarians vs. those actually run by 
meat-eaters-rather than a one-sided listing of risks 
supposedly, possibly run by vegetarians-might well 
leave the vegetarians far ahead on Weir's risk criterion 
for choosing or imposing a diet. 
Turning to Weir's charges of ambiguity concerning 
an "adequate" diet, he legitimately points out that 
nutritional needs vary, so that what is adequate for one 
group of people may not be so for another. However, 
other than his totally unsubstantiated claim that 
children need animal protein, his "facts" do not 
indicate that there are people who cannot, based on 
their physiological needs, obtain adequate nutrients from 
vegetable products. Consequently, whatever ambiguity 
may be involved here is irrelevant to the substantive 
issue of an obligation not to exploit animals for food. 
In addition to that ambiguity, Weir seems to be 
bothered by the ideaofrelying on dietary "supplements," 
i. e., pills and liquids consumed just to insure adequate 
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nutnlJon. The phrase "dietary supplement" suggests 
that a diet should be defined without reference to these 
products. However, advocates of vegetarianism, such 
as John Robbins, do not hesitate to recommend that 
these products be included as a part of one's diet to 
insure that we get all the nutrients we need. So there is 
an ambiguity here. Also, the need to "supplement" a 
diet may suggest that the diet itself is inadequate. 
Morally, these issues are trivial. People who do 
not eat meat or who avoid eating animal products 
altogether can obtain all needed nutrients without 
supplements, and this is true whether they are young 
or old, male or female, pregnant or not, and so forth. 
The supplementary pills or liquids simply make it 
easier and more certain that this is accomplished. 
These supplements would raise a significant, 
compromising issue for a vegetarian diet if they always 
involved animal products, but Weir does not suggest 
this-and for good reason, for there are non-animal 
produced supplements. 
Since they are trivial matters, we can easily answer 
Weir's concerns about ambiguity regarding "vege-
tarianism" and "adequacy" by saying that the questioo is: 
Can a diet that contains no meat or even animal products 
at all provide all the nutrients needed for robust human 
health, and is this the case for women as well as men, 
the young as well as the old, those who are pregnant as 
well as those who are not, and so forth? Thus defining 
a vegetarian diet by what it excludes leaves open the 
possibility that it includes "supplements." And if 
including "supplements" in the diet offends anyone's 
conceptual sensitivities, just call them "dietary 
enhancers" rather than supplements. The substantive 
point is that the answer to that question is "Yes" in both 
the meat-free and vegan cases and for young and old, 
male and female, etc. The evidence for that answer is 
the tens of millions of young and old, male and female, 
etc., healthy vegetarians and the many scientific studies 
of them that conflI1l1 their health. 
A final word on Weir's comments concerning 
nutrition: he may well have a hidden agenda here. Weir 
frequently raises environmental concerns, uses the word 
"natural" repeatedly (as in his "fact" aboutB-12),asserts 
several times that we are omnivores "by nature," seems 
offended by the idea ofbeing dependent on technology 
(e. g., vitamin pills) for nutrients, and sees "plastic 
meals" at the bottom of the slippery slope of 
vegetarianism. So, perhaps his opposition to vegetar-
ianism really lies in his feeling that is is unnatural and 
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a threat to the rural way of life he prefers. Weir 
acknowledges that he has lived on a family farm and 
waxes idyllic about the possibilities of such farming. 
Of course, that Weir likes to think of himself as a 
steak chewer rather than a vitamin swallower does not 
count for much when the question is whether we have 
a moral obligation to stop exploiting animals for food. 
Furthennore, Weir may well be mistaken about what 
humans are "by nature." According to the president of 
the Medical Students Association at Stanford 
University, who is a vegetarian, our dentition, facial 
structure, and digestive tracts do not closely resemble 
those of natural omnivores, such as bears. Rather, our 
physiology suggests that we are herbivores by nature. 
Perhaps meat and other animal products were the easy, 
secure dietary supplements of our herbivorous 
ancestors, supplements on which they came to place 
ever greater reliance as they developed the unnatural 
technologies of domestication and ranching. 
If Weir wants to tackle a substantive issue of 
ambiguity in moral philosophy, he should question, 
rather than uncritically use, the term "natural." For 
example, even it if is "natural" for us (humans) to 
exercise our vastly superior power to exploit and kill 
animals for a compact source of nutrients, does that 
make it right? I should think not, for the fact that it is 
"natural" for males of our species to exploit females 
does not make that right. However, Weir's uncritical, 
repeated reliance on the term "natural" suggests that 
what (he thinks) is "natural" for humans is right. 
Again, to say that we are something "by nature" 
suggests that is is not a matter ofchoice. Btit it is people 
who choose to be vegetarians. So, even if we were 
omnivores "by nature," that could not entail that we 
cannot choose to be otherwise. Furthermore, one of 
the things Weir cites as making humans especially 
worthy is our autonomy. It would seem that his idea of 
human "nature" is a very convenient one: it excuses 
our exploiting animals as inevitable but does not 
interfere with our congratulating ourselves on being 
superior to animals because we are autonomous. 
Again, Weir, like many environmentalists, seems to 
view doing what's "natural" as returning to a simpler, 
non-technological, rural way of life. But ifbiology has 
taught us anything for the past century and a half, it is 
that change is what nature is all about. What we, like 
all creatures, are "by nature" is in a process ofevolution. 
Consequently, appeals to what we are "by nature" 
cannot entail that we must or even ought to remain as 
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we are or return to what we were. As Sartre would say, 
such inferences are exercises in bad faith. 
Finally, some of the environmental concerns raised 
by Weir are bogus. For example, in the United States 
and United Kingdom we already produce more eggs, 
dairy products, and plant protein than we can consume 
or sell abroad for food. Also, most of the plant protein 
we raise is currently fed to cattle. So, it is far from 
obvious that turning to these resources to replace 
nutrients presently obtained from meat would threaten 
environmental havoc. Weir's legitimate environmental 
concerns indicate only that implementing world-wide 
vegetarianism would have to incorporate environmental 
protection caveats and socio-economic reforms. That 
this is so does not show that we are not obligated to 
become vegetarians; it shows only that fulfilling that 
obligation may be more complicated than some people 
may have thought. 
Thus, it is Weir's "reasons" for doubting the adequacy 
of a vegetarian diet that are anemic and in need of supple-
mentsbefore they canpovidea:leqWlle fare foran impartial 
mind. However, in this case the evidence indicates that 
supplements do not exist. The evidence indicates that 
the claim that "a vegetarian diet is adequate for human 
nutrition" is neither false nor substantively ambiguous. 
The Empirical Argument from Pain 
Weir contends that "a pleasure-pain calculus taken 
by itself would require that we eat meat" However, 
the basic thrust of his discussion seems to be to discredit 
hedonistic utilitarianism altogether. For example, he 
argues that a hedonistic calculus may entail "a duty to 
bring about the extinction of the human species" and 
contends that even "the mere plausibility" of this 
conclusion "is a reductio adabsurdum for the hedonistic 
utilitarian argument." 
The points Weir makes in this part of his paper have 
been made many times before, from Leslie Stephens' 
"If all the world were Jewish, there would be no pigs at 
all" to R. G. Frey's elaborate catalog of the Armageddon 
consequences of vegetarianism in Rights, Killing and 
Suffering (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). They have also 
been refuted many times before; for example, I have 
discussed questions about the utility of exploiting 
animals at length in Chapters 6, 10, and 11 of Morals, 
Reason, andAnimals (philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1987). Consequently, I will restrict my comments 
here to the following. 
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First, Weir totally undermines his argument for the 
utility ofexploiting animals by admitting that if people 
would maintain animals in good condition and not 
slaughter them for food, such a world wouldbe hedonis-
tically superior to animal-exploiting worlds. He goes 
on to say, however, that we should not consider such a 
world, because humans are not unselfish enough to 
mainIain it. TIisresramill mjtldied W'ml running moral 
tIxlught experiments, we are entitled to consider altruistic 
options. Especially where utilitarian hedonistic 
calculations provide the test, we are entitled to envisage 
worlds in which humans act on the basis of utilitarian, 
hedonistic calculations. Such worlds can at least define 
guiding ideal obligations for our real world of less than 
perfect, utilitarian altruism. It follows that Weir's 
analysis ofpossible worlds fails to show that hedonistic, 
utilitarian calculations require exploiting animals. 
Second, Weir insists on being tough-minded about 
the suffering that would be imposed on animals by 
massive dependence on eggs and dairy products for 
nutrients. But his talk of animals being "raised 
humanely and killed mercifully" for massive 
dependence on meat for nutrients goes beyond a 
romanticized view of traditional farming to a see-no-
evil refusal to acknowledge the massive animal 
suffering involved in the production ofmassive amounts 
of meat to feed billions ofhumans. Weir's idyllic vision 
extends even to "tax breaks and legislation [which will] 
help insure that lands near cities will be reserved for 
small farms." I hesitate to startle a sweet dreamer, but 
the lands near cities have already been developed into 
suburbs. And in northern California, I am sure, 
agribusiness interests in the Sacramento and San 
Joaquin Valleys are no more ready to turn over their 
land to family farmers than millions and millions of 
urban- and suburbanites are ready to spend additional 
hours and hours on the roads forsaking supermarkets 
to shop at family farms. 
Weir also tough-mindedly emphasizes the 
environmental dangers of increased egg and dairy 
protection. Somehow, he overlooks well-known 
environmental benefits of eliminating meat production. 
For example, billions of acres of rain forests and other 
native lands have been and are continuing to be 
destroyed to make way for pastures to graze cattle and 
fields to raise grain to feed to cattle. World-wide 
vegetarianism would put an end to this pattern of 
destruction and could even lead to the return of many 
native eco-systems, since we will need less vegetable 
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protein if we eat it ourselves, rather than feeding it to 
animals and then eating them. Thus, Weir's discussion 
of the environmental effects ofvegetarianism continues 
the one-sided pattern of argument begun with his 
discussion of dietary risks. 
Third, Weir suggests that the only remedy for the 
inadequacy of hedonistic utilitarianism as a moral 
philosophy is to postulate a non-hedonistic, "intrinsic" 
value possessed by humans and human-like animals. 
However, this is not the only way of coping with that 
inadequacy (if it exists). For example, the following 
maxim from William James points to another way: 
"Take any demand, however slight, which any creature, 
however weak, may make. Ought it not, for its own 
sake, to be satisfied? If not, prove why not" 
Weir begins, as so many moral philosophers have 
and still do, with the hierarchical presumption that one 
has to have some special value in order to be worthy of 
not being exploited. James, like other modern moral 
philosophers who insist on the fundamental importance 
of principles of equality, challenges that aristocratic 
presumption. In effect, James is contending that from 
the moral point of view one does not have to be of 
special value to be worthy of having one's interests 
satisfied. The advance ofegalitarianism and the retreat 
of feudalism during the modern era favor James' 
egalitaWl emphasis over Weir's aristocratic presumption. 
"Is he worthy of fair treatment?" seems to many modem 
ears a very strange question, indeed. 
Thus, Weir's one-sided thought experiments fail to 
discredit the proposition that "a meat diet causes 
unnecessary pain," and his suggestion that only an 
anthropocentric, aristocratic postulation of value can 
overcome the (supposed) inadequacies of hedonistic 
utilitarianism is mistaken; rejecting aristocratic 
presumptions in favor of egalitarianism can also 
overcome those (supposed) inadequacies. 
The Moral Argument from Unnecessary Pain 
According to Weir, the Principle of Unnecessary 
Pain states that "pain can be inflicted only in cases of 
genuine conflict and only in order to prevent an 
unavoidable worse evil." (How one prevents the 
unavoidable, I do not know. Perhaps Weir intended to 
say "otherwise unavoidable.") Weir does not object to 
this principle but contends that it does not prohibit 
killing animals for food, because "nutrition and health 
are surely significant and legitimate overriding moral 
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conflicts; no autonomous person can reasonably be 
coerced to put their health at risk. ..As a matter of fact, 
the pain inflicted is not wrnecessary." 
Although Weir believes that he has a third, moral 
objection to the vegetarian argument here, this objection 
basically just repeats his empirical contention that 
vegetarianism is risky. We have already discredited that 
contention. 
Weir's one moral claim here is that people cannot 
reasonably be coerced into putting their health at risk. 
That "coerced" is purple prose, of course; the issue is 
whether people can reasonably be obligated to put their 
health at risk. There is a considerable consensus that 
they can be. Fa" example, Socrates believed he was under 
an obligation to serve in the army, thereby putting his 
health at risk. He even believed himself to be obligated 
to remain faithful to his philosophical convictions, even 
though this put his health more than at risk. Many other 
patriots have shared at least Socrates' belief thatcitizens 
can reasonably be obligated (even forced) to put their 
health at risk in the defense of their community. "Death 
bef<re dishonor" is another, not uncommon, m<Yal slogan 
covering a variety of situations in which obligations 
are recognized which will put people's health at risk.. 
So, it is not obvious that we cannot have an 
obligation which might put our health at risk. 
Consequently, even ifa vegetarian diet were riskier than 
a meat-eating diet, it would not follow that we are not 
obligated by the principle of unnecessary pain to be 
vegetarians. Contrary to whatWeir apparently believes, 
there is no guarantee that a moral life will be a safe and 
easy one; convictions can require courage. 
Conclusion 
Since Weir's critique of the unnecessary pain 
argument for vegetarianism focuses on questions of 
nutrition, the basic response to his defense of meat-
eating is that his fears about the risks being run by 
vegetarians are unfounded. Consequently, we are not 
tragically condemned by nutritional dependency on 
meat to continue exploiting animals for food. If Weir 
does sincerely "wish things were otherwise" than he 
has made them out to be, then he can be of good cheer: 
they are otherwise, and paying a little, nutritionally-
informed attention to his diet or even just swallowing a 
vitamin pill now and then can easily and reliably keep 
him safe from the bogies which, apparently, have 
heretofore frightened him away from an ethical diet. 
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